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BY MICHAEL D. FRAKES*
ABSTRACT
Classified boards constitute one of the most potent takeover defenses
for U.S. firms today. However, as with takeover defenses more generally,
economic theory offers an ambiguous prediction as to the effect that
classified boards have on bottom-line firm value. A resolution of this
ambiguity will require sound and convincing empirical methodology. In
an effort to address limitations in the existing empirical literature, this
article approaches the relationship between corporate governance andfirm
value while taking various measures to account for unobserved sources of
heterogeneity across firms. Using the instrumental variables model
developed by Hausman and Taylor,' I find evidence of a negative and
statistically significant association between classified board status andfirm
value. I confirm these findings using a variation of the difference-in-
difference-in-difference model recently employed by Rauh.2 However,
using quantile regressions, I find evidence suggesting that this negative
association may be concentrated along the upper tail of the distribution of
firm value.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, academics and practitioners have
devoted significant attention to the benefits and costs of takeover defenses.
The question remains, however, as to what effect such defenses ultimately
have on the value of the firm. Given the variation in legal rules across
jurisdictions and the discretion that firms possess in structuring their
corporate governance profiles, firms do vary notably with respect to their
ability to fend off unsolicited takeover bids. This variation offers the
*Ph.D. candidate (economics), B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. J.D., Harvard
Law School. Member, Delaware Bar. I am grateful to Lucian Bebchuk for his helpful comments
and for providing hand-coded data on charter-based classified board status. I am also grateful to
the National Science Foundation and Harvard Law School's John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics, and Business for providing financial support.
'Jerry Hausman & William Taylor, Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects, 49
ECONOMETMCA 1377, 1378-79, 1383-89 (1981).
2Joshua D. Rauh, Own Company Stock in Defined Contribution Pension Plans: A
Takeover Defense?, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 379, 399-401 (2006).
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potential for empirical identification of the relationship between corporate
governance and firm value.
Absent strong empirical guidance, analysts will likely remain
uncertain as to the nature and extent of the relationship between
governance and value. Theoretical analysis alone leaves academics and
practitioners in numerous camps. Some claim that the threat of takeovers
may alleviate ex ante agency costs and properly align incentives by offering
a form of discipline for ineffective management.3 Where managers and
directors face little threat of removal by outsiders and inadequate
monitoring by shareholders, those managers and directors may exploit the
consequent breathing room by engaging in numerous forms of self-serving
behavior: extracting unreasonable compensation and perquisites, building
inefficient "empires," rejecting value-enhancing acquisition offers, or
redirecting business operations towards self-interested ventures.4 With
these possibilities in mind, such analysts claim that takeover defenses will
only serve to remove the ability of the market to limit destructive behavior
on the part of managers.5
On the other hand, many claim that takeover defenses allow
management to avoid unnecessary distractions and remain focused on
current operations and long-term planning.6 The threat of a hostile takeover
may cause managers to over-discount future periods and focus excessively
on short-term results.7 Additionally, takeover defenses may provide
managers and directors with an important source of bargaining leverage in
friendly acquisition discussions, allowing them to negotiate higher
acquisition premiums.8
Recognizing the net theoretical ambiguity, academics have devoted
copious efforts to empirical testing of the impacts of takeover defenses.
Empirical investigations have taken two approaches: (1) measure the
impact of defenses on the various intermediate stages (e.g., the effect on
premium bids in friendly acquisitions),9 and (2) account for all such
3See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 993-94 (2002).4Id. at 994.
'See, e.g., id. at 991-95.6See, e.g., id. at 1011.
7See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1011.
8See Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE
L.J. 621, 629-30 (2003). For a general review of the numerous arguments made in favor of
allowing directors to block acquisition efforts, see Bebchuk, supra note 3.
9See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 8, at 667-81 (estimating the effect of the strength of
takeover defenses on bid premiums received by shareholders in negotiated acquisitions).
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behaviors simultaneously by measuring the net effect on firm value.'
Despite sacrificing a more structural specification, this article follows the
second of these approaches and employs a reduced form model to estimate
the impact of classified boards on firm value. Given the difficulties
involved in modeling the aggregation of the intermediate channels, the
reduced-form approach offers perhaps the only hope for evaluating the
question in which we are ultimately interested: does governance enhance
bottom-line shareholder value? With the proper methodology, this
empirical exercise may prove quite instructive to both firms and
policymakers alike.
A growing body of empirical literature has taken the second
approach and tackled estimation of the relationship between governance
and firm value." The current literature, however, focuses excessively on
measuring the effect of an index of governance provisions. 2 Such studies
suffer from numerous shortcomings, most significant of which is the fact
that a given index level' 3 does not represent a unique measure of
entrenchment. In all likelihood, it is the precise composition of that index
that matters. Firms with poison pills and limits to amend charters may earn
an index value of 2. Nonetheless, such firms may be more embedded than
others with antigreenmail provisions and limitations on director liability.
Treating these separate firms as having identical governance profiles will
cloud any attempt to measure a precise link between corporate governance
and firm value. Partially avoiding these limitations, this article looks
within these indices and focuses on the specific impact of one of the
strongest takeover defenses available: classified boards. In firms with
classified boards (also known as "staggered boards"), only a fraction of the
directors stand for election each year, thereby forcing stockholders to wait
for at least two annual elections before they can acquire control of the
board of directors.
In addition to offering a more structural econometric model, by
looking within the governance index, this approach offers more useful
guidance to judges, legislators, directors, and other parties involved in
shaping corporate governance profiles. Such parties do not face the
decision of whether or not to encourage more or less of the amorphous
'0See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J.
ECON. 107, 125-29 (2003) (estimating the effect of an index of governance provisions on firm
value).
"See, e.g., id.
12See, e.g., id.
13In such studies, index values for each firm are constructed by adding one point for every
corporate governance provision maintained by such firm (out of the available provisions
comprising the index). See, e.g., id at 109.
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thing called a "takeover defense." Rather, they must know how to address
each provision independently. 4 With this in mind, it becomes important
to estimate the isolated effects of provisions like classified boards.
One must also recognize that governance provisions are not random
characteristics of firms. In many cases, firms select the structures they
desire, and in the process, they may trade off other governance provisions.15
In addition to illustrating the limitations of an index approach, these trade-
offs highlight the fact that the composition of governance structures is
changing over time. Business combination statutes may have been
meaningful in earlier times. However, devices such as classified boards
and other takeover provisions that limit one's ability to wage a proxy
contest are of far greater significance today and may even render most other
defenses irrelevant.' 6  After Delaware's validation of the classified
board/poison pill combination in the mid-1990s,"7 one could argue that
classified boards now offer the most potent protection available. 8
Consequently, despite addressing a seemingly dated issue, by focusing on
classified boards, this article offers novel contributions to the existing
corporate governance literature.
In a recent study, Bebchuk and Cohen respond to this transformation
in the corporate governance landscape and take an intensive look at the
relationship between firm value and classified boards." Using pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators on an unbalanced sample compiled
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), they find that
classified boards are associated with a reduction in firm value.20  By
focusing on classified boards specifically, Bebchuk and Cohen's analysis
"Of course, policymakers also want to understand the interactions among various
governance devices. Nonetheless, index approaches provide an imperfect means of studying
interactive mechanisms.
15For instance, firms with classified boards and poison pills may decide that they need
little else in the way of protection.
'6See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271,320-23 (2000); see also Gompers et al., supra note 10,
at 111-12 (noting that the dynamics of modern takeover battles, which are shaped by blank check
preferred stock provisions, classified board provisions, special meeting limitations, and provisions
limiting stockholder actions by written consent, may have "rendered all other defenses
superfluous").
17See Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J. L., ECON., & ORG.
32, 52-53 (2004) (noting that the outcome of three takeover contests involving Delaware firms
in the mid-1990s may have solidified the ability of a target with a staggered board to maintain its
poison pill after having lost the first round of a proxy contest against a hostile bidder).
"Cf. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON.
409, 410,412 (2005).
'91d. at 420-24.201d. at 424.
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improves upon those studies concerned exclusively with governance
indices. Like most of the relevant literature, however, their analysis suffers
from various econometric limitations. Given the endogenous nature of
classified board status, Bebchuk and Cohen's model raises the concern that
other factors missing from the specification are responsible for the
estimated relationship. Particularly, the failure to account for unobservable
firm-fixed effects may be generating a significant bias in the estimated
coefficients.
The aim of this article is to build upon the empirical groundwork laid
by Bebchuk and Cohen and the corresponding studies. I explore various
econometric models in an attempt to generate unbiased coefficients that
account for unobservable factors. First, unlike much of the recent
governance literature, I embrace the panel nature of the IRRC data. With
endogeneity and omitted variables concerns and a lack of potential
instruments, it may be imprudent to rely solely on pooled OLS
specifications. Containing both cross-sectional and time-series variation,
panel data offers powerful econometric tools that may allow one to
eliminate the influence of unobservable factors.
However, standard panel data fixed-effects models, which exploit
variation in firms over time, cannot identify the relationship between
classified boards and firm value, given the time-invariant nature of the
classified board variable. To avoid this limitation and to allow for the use
of valuable cross-sectional information, I employ the instrumental variables
model developed by Hausman and Taylor.2" If the identification conditions
are met, the Hausman-Taylor model controls for firm-fixed effects while
still identifying the coefficient of the time-invariant variable of interest.22
Using the same IRRC dataset as Bebchuk and Cohen,23 I estimate a
negative and statistically significant relationship between classified boards
and firm value.
As an alternative to the Hausman-Taylor model, I estimate a
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) model in an attempt to
account for unobservable factors that are correlated with both classified
board incidence and firm value. I utilize several dimensions of variation in
structuring the DDD estimator, including the state of incorporation, pre-
and post-1995, and the likelihood of having a classified board. Under this
alternative approach, I again document a negative and statistically
significant relationship between classified boards and firm value. The
21Hausman & Taylor, supra note 1, at 1378-79, 1383-89.
221d.
23Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 418.
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estimated effects are of a considerable magnitude, suggesting that the
relationship is also economically meaningful.
As a final robustness check on the model and on the underlying
theory, I run quantile regressions of firm value on classified board status.
Quantile specifications are robust to the impact of outlying observations
and allow for relaxation of the assumption of homogenous effects along the
full distribution of the dependent variable.24 The results of this quantile
approach indicate that classified boards have either no effect or a slight
positive effect on firm value for the least valuable firms. However, for
firms at the upper end of the distribution of firm value, the results indicate
a stronger negative effect. This pattern suggests that classified boards may
not be wholly negative for firms, despite the estimation of a negative
relationship on average. Rather, classified boards may generate positive
contributions to firm value in certain circumstances.
This article is divided into seven parts. Part II surveys prior
empirical work regarding the link between governance and value. Part In
describes the data and provides summary statistics. Part IV presents the
methodology and results for the Hausman-Taylor estimator. Part V
explains the methodology and results for the triple-differences (DDD)
estimator. Part VI discusses the application of quantile regressions.
Finally, Part VII concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A wealth of literature has explored the consequences that attach to
corporate governance mechanisms. Many studies take a focused approach
and examine the effects of corporate governance on specific managerial
behaviors and specific measures of firm performance. Such studies are best
viewed as "intermediate" inquiries, given that they leave ambiguous the net
effect on firm valuation.
The empirical results derived from this "intermediate" literature
present mixed findings with respect to the impact of governance structures
on firm behavior. Bertrand and Mullainathan find a rise in CEO
compensation as a result of state antitakeover laws, consistent with the"skimming" hypothesis, whereby executives provide themselves greater
24See Roger Koenker & Gilbert Bassett, Jr., Regression Quantiles, 46 ECONOMETRICA
33, 33-34, 38 (1978); see also Probal Chaudhuri et al., On Average Derivative Quantile
Regression, 25 ANN. STATIST. 715, 715 (1997).
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compensation as a result of entrenchment.25 Using a sample of all
negotiated acquisitions of U.S. public company targets, Subramanian
rejects the hypothesis that the enhanced bargaining power in friendly
negotiations attributable to takeover defenses leads to an increase in
negotiated bid premiums. 26  Garvey and Hanka find that "second
generation" antitakeover laws significantly reduced debt loads taken on by
firms, providing evidence in support of the views that takeover threats
discipline management and that managerial discretion, as influenced by the
takeover environment, can impact a firm's capital structure.2 Using a
sample of firms between 1979 and 1985, Johnson and Rao find no
significant evidence of a deleterious effect of antitakeover charter
amendments on (1) operating income, (2) research and development, (3)
capital expenditures, and (4) operating and overhead costs. 28
Other studies that would be classified as "intermediate" include those
that address the trade-offs that firms make among alternative governance
structures. In one such study, Rauh finds that Delaware's validation of the
classified board/poison pill combination in the mid-1990s was associated
with a significant negative effect on employee ownership of own-company
stock, supporting an inference that management's inducement of employees
to acquire own-company stock in defined compensation plans is a form of
takeover defense.29
Results from this "intermediate" literature have motivated numerous
analysts to estimate the aggregate effect of corporate governance
mechanisms on firm value. Some studies take a global approach and
explore such relationships using data from a cross section of countries. For
instance, La Porta and his colleagues find evidence of higher valuation of
firms in countries that provide greater protection for minority
25see MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
AND INCENTIVES: THE IMPACT OF TAKEOVER LEGISLATION 4-5, 25-29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6830, 1998), available at http://www.inter.org/papers/s6830; see
also Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Managerial Compensation and the Threat of
Takeover, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 233-34 (1998) (finding evidence that an increase in takeover
threats restrains managers' abilities to extract higher wages); Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., CEO
Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495 (1997) (finding evidence that
antitakeover charter amendments help managers maintain compensation at above-market levels).
26Subramanian, supra note 8, at 669-79.
27Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The
Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 J. FIN. 519, 526-43 (1999).
2 Mark S. Johnson & Ramesh P. Rao, The Impact of Antitakeover Amendments on
Corporate Financial Performance, 32 FIN. REV. 659, 660, 669 (1997); see also Andrei Shleifer
& Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997) (surveying a
range of studies that examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance).
29Rauh, supra note 2, at 401.
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shareholders °.3  While perhaps limited in terms of generality, intra-country
studies avoid many of the limitations of cross-country regressions, such as
sample size and omitted variables. Fortunately, corporate governance
profiles vary enough across U.S. corporations to identify the effects of
these structures.
Originating a line of intra-country literature, Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny document a significant non-monotonic relationship between firm
value and managerial ownership, with firm value increasing, then
decreasing, and finally increasing again as the proportion of shares held by
management rises. 31 Other intra-country approaches employ event-study
methodologies, examining market responses to the occurrence of certain
events. For instance, Ryngaert examines changes in stock prices following
the adoption of poison pills.32 Karpoff and Malatesta find that the
announcement of state antitakeover legislation is associated with a small
but statistically significant decline in the stock prices of affected firms.3
Results derived from such event studies, however, suffer from potential
estimation bias, given that the relevant announcement (e.g., the
30Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147
(2002). 31Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical
Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 293 (1988). See also Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach,
The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, 20 FIN. MGMT.
101, 111 (1991) (finding evidence that corporate performance improves with managerial
ownership at low levels of ownership but declines with managerial ownership at higher levels);
John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate
Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595, 595 (1990) (finding evidence of a curvilinear relationship between
Tobin's Q and the fraction of common stock owned by corporate insiders, with the relationship
turning from positive to negative at 40-50% insider ownership). But see Harold Demsetz & Belen
Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 209, 230 (2001)
(finding no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between ownership structure and
firm performance using two stage least squares regressions that account for the endogeneity of
ownership structure); Charles P. Himmelberg et al., Understanding the Determinants of
Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance, 53 J. FIN. ECON. 353,
372-73 (1999) (finding no statistically significant relationship between managerial ownership and
firm performance using panel data regressions that control for firm-fixed effects).32Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J.
FIN. ECON. 377, 410 (1988) (finding evidence of a stock price decline associated with the
announcement of the adoption of the most restrictive forms of poison pills).33Jonathan Karpoff & Paul Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State
Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291 (1989); see also, e.g., John Pound, The Effects
ofAntitakeoverAmendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence, 30 J. L. & ECON. 353,
359, 361 (1987) (finding evidence of a strong negative effect of antitakeover amendments on the
frequency of takeover bids but no evidence of an effect of antitakeover amendments on takeover
premiums); Samuel H. Szewczyk & George P. Tsetsekos, State Intervention in the Market for
Corporate Control: The Case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1992)
(finding evidence that a Pennsylvania antitakeover statute led to significantly negative abnormal
returns for firms incorporated in Pennsylvania).
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announcement of a poison pill adoption) may also provide an informative
signal to investors, leaving it difficult to isolate the effect of the relevant
corporate governance mechanism itself.34 Moreover, those event studies
that follow poison pill adoptions fail to recognize that a firm need not have
a pill in place to be able to benefit from its potential protection, given the
ability to adopt a pill after a hostile bid has commenced.35
Measuring the aggregate effect of Delaware state corporate law on
shareholder wealth, Robert Daines finds that firms incorporated in
Delaware are associated with higher Tobin's Q values than their non-
Delaware counterparts (where Tobin's Q is used as an estimate of firm
value).36 Daines avoids the pitfalls of event study methodologies by
employing cross-sectional regressions on a large sample of exchange-traded
corporations.37 Daines' results support the view that state corporate law is
an important feature of corporate governance.38
A recent line of research has studied the impact on firm valuation of
a broad index of governance provisions that proxy for the strength of
shareholder rights. Pioneering these studies, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
construct one such index (the GIM Index) and find that firms with stronger
shareholder rights are associated with higher firm value.39 However, it is
difficult to interpret these results in light of various limitations of an index
approach. There is little reason to believe that each component of the index
will affect firm value in the same manner. Moreover, the provisions of the
index may be endogenous to each other. For instance, a firm that adopts a
classified board may find many other provisions unnecessary and
consequently drop them. The net effect may be a reduction in the index
value, despite an increase in entrenchment potential. A more powerful
'See Coates, supra note 16, at 298-306.
3 5See id. at 286-88.
36Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527
(2001).
371d. at 531-32.
38ld. at 556.
3 9Gompers et al., supra note 10, at 126-29. For related work, see Belen Villalonga &
Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?, 80 J.
FIN. ECON. 385, 397-401 (2006) (estimating the effect of family ownership, control, and
management on firm value while controlling for the GIM Index); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay
B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60J. FIN. 2859,2887-88 (2005) (examining
the interaction between internal and external governance mechanisms and finding that firms with
high takeover vulnerability, as proxied by two alternative governance indices, but no public
pension fund blockholder, have a higher firm value than firms with both high takeover
vulnerability and public pension fund blockholders); Mark Klock et al., Does Corporate
Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QuANT. ANAL. 693, 708-09 (2005) (finding
evidence that strong antitakeover provisions, as proxied by high levels of the GIM Index, are
associated with a lower cost of debt financing).
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approach would be to look within this index and identify the effects of
specific structures. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell move in this direction by
constructing a smaller index, which, they believe, accounts for the bulk of
the entrenchment potential among the twenty-four provisions identified in
the GIM Index.' This narrower index focuses on four constitutional
limitations on shareholder voting power (including classified boards) and
two key takeover readiness measures.4 Their findings confirm the negative
relationship found by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick.42
Several recent studies have focused on the relationship between
classified board status and firm performance. Using a dataset that includes
all hostile bids between 1996 and 2000, Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian
find evidence that the possession of an "effective" staggered board in the
face of a hostile bid nearly doubles the odds of remaining independent,
halves the odds that a first bidder will be successful, and reduces the odds
that a target will be forced to sell to a white knight.43 Moreover, they find
that "effective" staggered boards reduce expected returns for shareholders
in target firms during the period of time after a hostile bid is launched."
Bebchuk and Cohen address the same question motivating this article: what
effect do classified boards have on bottom-line firm value?4 5 Running
pooled OLS regressions, they document a negative and statistically
significant relationship between classified board status and firm value,
where firm value is proxied by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q.46 Estimating
Fama-MacBeth, pooled OLS and certain other specifications on a sample
of 2,021 firms between 1995 and 2002, Faleye also documents a negative
association between classified boards and Tobin's Q.47
Including the Tobin's Q value in 1990 (i.e., a lagged dependent
variable) as an additional control variable in their specification, Bebchuk
4°LUCIAN BEBCHUK ET AL., WHAT MATTERS IN CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE 6-9 (Harvard
Law School Discussion Paper No. 491, rev. 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com; Gompers
et al., supra note 10, at 145-50.41See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 40, at 2.42 Compare id. at 3-4, with Gompers et al., supra note 10, at 126-29.
43Lucian Bebchuk et al., The PowerfulAntitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence and Policy, 54 STANFORD L. REv. 887, 890, 931 (2002). Bebchuk, Coates, and
Subramanian classify a staggered board as an "effective staggered board" if(i) the staggered board
is established in the firm's charter, (ii) the firm's directors may only be removed for cause and (iii)
the firm's shareholders are prohibited from "pack[ing] the board" by increasing the number of
directors and filling the resulting vacancies. Id. at 895.
44Id. at 937-39.
45Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 410.
46d. at 420-24.
47Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, J.
FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=877216, at 6, 9-16.
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and Cohen continue to find a negative association between classified
boards and firm value."a As a result, they argue that the relationship may
be causal because the negative correlation between classified boards and
post-1995 firm value cannot be explained by the initial selection of
classified boards by firms with low Qs in 1990.' 9 Supporting this claim,
Bebchuk and Cohen note that classified board status was largely
determined as of 1990.50 However, while Bebchuk and Cohen's analysis
may alleviate concerns as to the direction of the association, it still does not
ensure that the estimated relationship itself is unbiased. To the extent there
are unobservedfxed characteristics of firms that are correlated with both
firm value and classified board status, one will be unable to disentangle the
effects of classified boards from the effects of such unobservable fixed
factors, even after controlling for the 1990 Tobin's Q value.5 More
generally, the use of lagged dependent variables will not address
correlations with unobservable fixed characteristics.52 Part IV of this
article attempts to account for these fixed factors in a more direct manner.
1II. DATA
A. Sources
The basic data source for this analysis is the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC). The IRRC published seven volumes of
governance data between 1990 and 2004 in Corporate Takeover Defenses.53
The IRRC data is available in electronic form at the Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS) website.' Each IRRC volume contains
4"Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 427-28.
491d. Faleye also addresses potential self-selection concerns by, among other things,
including controls for prior performance. See Faleye, supra note 47, at I 1-12.
5"Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 426.
5 Moreover, the various steps taken by Faleye, supra note 47, at 11-13, to address a
possible self-selection bias, including the use of controls for prior performance and the use of
average historical Q values as instruments, will not address any bias generated from the
correlation between classified board status and an unobservable fixed firm effect.52Even if one includes lagged dependent variables as additional regressors, "differencing"
steps, such as "first differencing" or transforming the observations into deviations from individual
means (i.e., fixed effects regression), are likely still required to remove unobservable fixed factors.
See, e.g., Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, 58 REV. ECON. STUDIES 277, 280
(1991) (transforming specifications into "first differences" in order to remove individual effects).
53INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER (IRRC), CORPORATE TAKEOVER
DEFENSES (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004).
5WRDS, available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu.
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comprehensive information pertaining to the corporate governance
structures of individual firms. The IRRC collects such information from
numerous resources: corporate bylaws, corporate charters, annual reports,
10-Ks, 10-Qs, and proxy statements.55  The IRRC data offers a
comprehensive representation of the nation's largest corporations. In the
1990 volume alone, the IRRC firms accounted for over 90% of the total
market capitalization of the nation's major stock exchanges.56 The data
covers all firms in the Standard & Poor's 500, along with firms represented
on annual lists of the largest corporations in the United States, as published
by various national business magazines.57 The resulting dataset is an
unbalanced panel of 3,030 individual firms over the fourteen-year period
between 1990 and 2004. Each IRRC volume contains data on 1,400 to
1,900 firms. Many firms are represented continuously throughout the
relevant time period; however, the represented list of firms does change
somewhat among the IRRC volumes.5"
The IRRC data documents twenty-four unique governance structures,
representing charter provisions, bylaw provisions, exposure to six state
takeover laws, and other firm-specific governance rules.59 Included in this
list of twenty-four provisions is the presence of a classified board. While
not provided in the electronic data made available by the WRDS, the IRRC
volumes do indicate, for each firm with a classified board, whether such
firm established the classified board in its bylaws or in its charter. Most of
the analysis below uses a general indicator for a classified board. However,
given that the effectiveness of classified boards is enhanced when they are
established in a firm's charter,' I also explore specifications that measure
the impact of charter-based classified boards.6'
Each specification employed below uses classified board status
(general or charter-based) as the regressor of interest. Each specification,
however, also controls in varying ways for the remainder of the IRRC
governance provisions. Failure to account for these measures may bias the
estimated coefficients because classified board status is likely correlated
with the presence of other governance devices. In each reported regression,
5 5Gompers et al., supra note 10, at 110.
561d. at 111.571d. at 110-11.
5 8For one of the specifications used in Part IV below, I form a balanced panel consisting
of 580 firms.5 9Gompers et al., supra note 10, at 111.
6 Bebchuk et al., supra note 43, at 895.
6 For the charter-based specifications explored below, I only use data for the years 1990-
2002.
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I control for the remaining IRRC provisions by including the GIM Index,62
adjusted accordingly to remove the contribution of classified boards (the
adjusted GIM Index). To avoid imposition of linearity in the relationship
between the adjusted GIM Index and firm value, I take a flexible approach
and include the index value and its square. As suggested above,
aggregating governance provisions into an index may limit the
interpretability and flexibility of the model. To alleviate the reliance on a
broad index, I also run unreported regressions in which I follow the
approach of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell63 and break the adjusted GIM
Index into two pieces. The first piece (the "entrenchment" index) is a
smaller index of five provisions that, together with classified boards, are
arguably most responsible for managerial entrenchment. These five
provisions include limits to amend bylaws, limits to amend charters,
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments, poison
pills, and golden parachutes.' 4 The second piece (the "other-provisions"
index) consists of an index covering the remainder of the IRRC
provisions.65
To form additional controls, I obtain data on firm financials from
Compustat's Industrial Annual files.66 I match this financial data to the
IRRC sample primarily using six-digit CUSIPs. In many cases, however,
I also use ticker symbols, stock exchanges, and company names to assist in
the matching process. Most of the financial controls employed are in ratio
format (e.g., return-on-assets) and thus do not require transformation into
real values. To account for firm size, however, I control for the total real
asset level of each firm, using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to transform nominal asset measures
into real 2002 dollars.67 Using CPI measures, I also transform annual sales
figures into real values and then calculate the three-year average annual
growth rate in real sales for each observation. I use the growth rate in real
sales to proxy for the investment and growth opportunities of the firm.6"
Using the Compustat financials, I calculate Tobin's Q for each
firm/year observation and use this measure as a proxy for firm value. In
6 2Gompers et al., supra note 10, at 114-15.
63BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 40, at 2, 11-13.
"Id. at 2.651d. at 11-13.
"Compustat data is compiled by Standard and Poor's and contains fundamental company
and market information on securities representing over 90% of the world's total market
capitalization. For more information, see http://wWw.compustat.com.
61CPI data is from the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics website.
See http:llwww.bls.gov/cpi/#data (last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
6 See La Porta et al., supra note 30, at 1159.
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general terms, Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the
firm to the replacement cost of its assets.69 While alternative formulations
of this variable exist,7° I follow Bebchuk and Cohen and Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick and calculate Tobin's Q as the market value of assets divided
by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals the
book value of assets plus the market value of common stock minus the sum
of the book value of common stock and the level of deferred taxes. 7'
Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q is calculated by subtracting from each
observation's Tobin's Q value the median Q value for the firm's
corresponding industry/year group.72 Many of the regressions reported in
this article use this industry-adjusted Q measure as the dependent variable.
In other specifications, however, I control more completely for industry
effects by using regular Tobin's Q as the dependent variable, along with a
full set of industry dummies.
I construct insider ownership measures for each firm using data
matched from Compustat's ExecuComp database. 73 For each firm, I
calculate the fraction of total outstanding shares held by directors and
officers. Following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, I calculate firm age by
determining the first time information about the relevant firm's stock
became available in the CRSP monthly database.74 I match CRSP data to
'E.g., Kee H. Chung & Stephen W. Pruitt, A Simple Approximation of Tobin's Q, 23 FIN.
MGMT. 70, 70 (1994).
7 See, e.g., id. at 70-74 (comparing alternative Tobin's Q calculations).7 tBebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 420; Gompers et al., supra note 10, at 151.72Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 420. Industry measures are generated using the
Compustat data. For each of the forty-eight Fama-French industry groups, I calculate annual
median values across all of the firms represented in the Compustat database. For a list of the
forty-eight Fama-French industry groups, see Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Industry Costs of
Equity, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 153, 179-181 (1997). After assigning Fama-French industry groups to
each of the IRRC firms, I match the Compustat-derived industry measures to the IRRC sample and
then calculate industry-adjusted Q values. Finally, following Daines, I trim observations with
industry-adjusted Tobin's Q in the upper and lower 1% of the sample. See Daines, supra note 36,
at 530. However, the results presented below are robust to alternative treatments of these
observations, including no modification at all.
73Standard & Poor's provides annual executive compensation data in the ExecuComp
database. For more information, see http://www.compustat.com.
74BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 40, at 15. CRSP stands for The Center for Research in
Securities Prices. CRSP was established by the University of Chicago's Graduate School of
Business and collects historical data on the NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ and other major securities
markets. See http://www.crsp.chicagogsb.edu (last visited Jan. 18, 2007). CRSP monthly data
is available from 1926. Id. Thus, firm ages for those firms that incorporated prior to 1926 are
censored at this end point. Censored right-hand-side variables may lead to estimation bias. See
ROBERTORIGOBON & THOMAS STOKER, CENSORED REGRESSIONS AND EXPANSION BIAS 1-9 (MIT
Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4451-03, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.coml
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=475481. However, only forty-seven firm/year observations are
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the IRRC sample using CUSIP numbers. Where this step is unsuccessful,
I match using additional firm information (e.g., company name, ticker, etc.).
I obtain data on institutional ownership from the Thomson Financial
ownership database.75 For each firm, I generate a dichotomous variable
indicating whether or not the firm has a large institutional shareholder,
defined by ownership of at least 5% of the total outstanding shares. This
variable, however, only accounts for shareholders that are mutual funds,
pension funds, insurance companies, corporations, and other 13(f)
institutions. 76 Thus, the variable does not account for large individual
shareholders.
While the IRRC data does not contain information for every year in
the period expanded by the IRRC volumes, I nonetheless construct the
panel on an annual basis. Following the prior literature, I fill in the missing
governance provisions assuming that the provisions in place at time t are
also in place at time t+1 and all subsequent years until the next IRRC
volume is available.77 Data obtained from Compustat, ExecuComp,
Thomson Financial, and CRSP required no filling.
Following Bebchuk and Cohen and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, I
exclude Real Estate Investment Trusts (RE1Ts) from the sample, given that
such firms have distinct governance restrictions that provide managers with
far less discretion in their operations than that afforded by other
corporations.78 I also exclude firms with dual class share structures, given
that the entrenchment potential of such firms may leave other governance
structures superfluous. 79 Also, the simple binary classification of "dual
class" may make it difficult to capture the wide variation in voting and
ownership structures that exist across dual class firms.80
affected by this censoring. When the censored observations are dropped to ensure consistency in
the estimates, the results below do not change.
75For more information on the Thomson Financial ownership data, see the WRDS website
at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu.76Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)
(2006)).
77BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 40, at 13; Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 418;
Gompers et al., supra note 10, at 113.78Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 418; BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 40, at 16.
REITs have various legal requirements that limit managerial discretion to divert cash flows. See,
e.g., Hartzell et al., The Role of the Underlying Real Asset Market in REITIPOs, REAL ESTATE
ECONOMICS, Jan. 2005, at 29.
79See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 418.
8°Gompers et al., supra note 10, at 111 n.5.
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B. Summary Statistics
Table I reports the means and standard deviations of the variables
used throughout this analysis. Sixty-one percent of the sample have a
classified board. Fifty-four percent have classified boards established in
their charters. The incidence of classified boards remains quite stable
across all years of the panel, ranging from 59% in 1990 to 63% in 1996.
Amongst all firms in the analysis, roughly 95% did not change their
classified board status over the years in which they were represented in the
data. These numbers confirm the relatively time-invariant nature of this
variable and motivate the instrumental variables strategy employed in Part
IV.
The mean value for the adjusted GIM Index is 8.6, with a standard
deviation of 2.6. For those firms with classified boards, the average
adjusted GIM Index value is 9.3. Fifty-four percent of the sample are
incorporated in Delaware. Average values for the other controls used in the
regressions are as follows: total assets in real 2002 dollars ($10.1 billion),
return-on-assets (2%), leverage (23%), fraction of shares held by insiders
(3%), incidence of large institutional shareholder (76%), company age in
months (296), ratio of capital expenditures to assets (6%), and three-year
average growth rate in sales (14.1%).
The data exhibit significant variation in these control variables
across the firms in the sample. With the exception of Delaware
incorporation, the data also demonstrate notable variation within individual
firms. For instance, 18% of the variation of firm assets across the sample
is due to variation within firms over time. This intra-firm variation allows
for more efficient estimation of the coefficients in the fixed-effects models
of Part IV.
The mean value of Tobin's Q across the sample is 1.85, with a
standard deviation of 1.5. The mean Q value for firms with classified
boards is 1.76. Few conclusions should be drawn from this simple
observation, however, given the failure to account for other factors
correlated with both firm value and classified board status. Firms with
classified boards are generally smaller than those without such structures
($7.4 billion in real assets versus $14.2 billion). They also have a lower
average growth rate in real sales (12.7% versus 16.3%) and a lower fraction
of shares held by insiders (2.8% versus 3.6%). Correlations between the
covariates and Tobin's Q are as follows: real assets (-0.05), return-on-assets
(0.11), leverage (-0.20), growth rate in real sales (0.16), insider ownership
share (0.04), large institutional shareholder incidence (-0.06), age (-0.14),
and capital expenditures-asset ratio (0.07). The correlation between Q and
the adjusted GIM Index is -0.11. The average Q value for Delaware firms
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is higher than that for firms incorporated elsewhere (1.94 versus 1.73). To
identify an unbiased relationship between classified board status and firm
value, it becomes important to control for these additional factors.
IV. FIXED EFFECTS: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. Background
I estimate regression equations of the following form:
Qit= a + PICBi + 2Xit + 3Git + X + Tt+ eit
where i indexes individual firms and t indexes the year. Q is the Tobin's Q
value for each firm (or its industry-adjusted value). CB is an indicator for
whether or not the firm has a classified board. X is a set of covariates and
their squares (e.g., firm age, firm size, etc.). G is the adjusted GIM Index
value and its square. Xi and -t are firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects,
respectively.
This model estimates the impact of classified boards on firm value,
controlling for fixed differences across firms and across years. This
specification also controls for various firm specific characteristics: firm
age, firm size, ratio of capital expenditures to assets, leverage ratio, return-
on-assets, three-year average annual growth rate in real sales, Delaware
incorporation, insider ownership share, incidence of large institutional
shareholder, and the adjusted GIM Index score. To avoid the imposition
of linearity, I control for levels of the continuous covariates along with their
squares.
Industry effects are addressed in two ways. Primarily, I use industry-
adjusted Tobin's Q as the dependent variable, in lieu of the firm's actual
Tobin's Q value. To control more completely for fixed differences across
industries, I also run regressions that include a full set of industry dummies.
While classified board status does change for some firms over the
sample period, CB is modeled in the above equation with an index of "i"
only to demonstrate its predominantly time-invariant nature. For each
regression in this section, I use Huber-White sandwich estimators to form
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the standard errors.8'
81Peter Huber, The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates under Nonstandard
Conditions, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFrH BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS AND PROBABIIrTY 221, 221-33 (Lucien M. Le Cam & Jerzy Neyman eds., 1967); Hal
White, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for
Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817, 818-21 (1980).
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One major limitation in the current literature is the failure to account
for omitted variables that may also be correlated with a firm's classified
board status. This problem is of particular concern given the endogenous
nature of the classified board variable. A plausible argument can be made,
however, that CB is uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error term, cit.
As noted by Bebchuk and Cohen, the classified board status of most firms
was largely fixed as of 1990.82 That is, firms that did not have classified
boards in their charters by the early 1990s found it very difficult to adopt
such provisions, given that shareholders over this period became reluctant
to approve these structures. Thus, according to Bebchuk and Cohen, the
fact that a firm does not have a classified board at any given year in the
sample does not reflect a decision by management at that time period.83
Moreover, for those firms with classified boards at the beginning of the
1990s, shareholders were generally powerless to remove them, given the
agenda-setting powers of the board.84 While this argument is inapposite to
those firms that incorporated during the 1990s, it does suggest that there
may be little need generally to worry about correlation between CB and cit.
However, to the extent that each firm has a fixed characteristic over
time for which the specification does not control and that is correlated with
both classified board status and firm value, the above argument as to the
predetermined nature of classified boards does not fully resolve the omitted
variables concern. If this firm-fixed factor was present in 1990 and played
a part in the classified board decision at that time, then the current
classified board status will still be correlated with this unobservable fixed
factor, leading to biased results. Bebchuk and Cohen do acknowledge this
observation and attempt to control for these fixed factors by including
lagged Tobin's Q as an additional right-hand side variable." However,
while this approach may remove some sources of autocorrelation and
address questions as to simultaneity, forming a dynamic panel by including
lagged dependent variables does not remove the influence of unobservable
firm-fixed effects.86 These omitted factors will still bias the estimated
12Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 426.
831d.
Mid.
"See id. at 427-28.
86 1f correlation between classified boards and the unobservable fixed factor is resulting
in biased estimates, then one must remove the unobservable factor from the specification to
resolve this bias (or account for it in some other direct manner). Controlling for 1990 Tobin's Q,
however, does not accomplish this removal. Essentially, controlling for this lagged Q value does
not provide much new information. CB and Xare present in the years following 1990 and impact
firm value, and both of them were present in 1990 and impacted firm value at that time. Thus,
controlling for 1990 Q does not allow one to sort out the differential effects of these two factors,
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relationship between classified boards and firm value. A more direct
solution is required to address correlation with firm-fixed effects. In linear
specifications, such as those employed in this section, economists typically
utilize "within" estimators to annihilate the unobservable fixed factors.87
Academics have identified various unobservable fixed factors of
concern in empirical governance studies.88 One such factor is the "self-
serving" inclinations of management. 89 Managerial inclinations may impact
firm value in that the most self-serving managers are likely to seek
significant private benefits of control. Those inclinations are also likely to
be correlated with the decision of whether or not to stagger the board.
Managers seeking to entrench themselves for their own gains will welcome
the leeway provided by classified boards. Of course, as pointed out by
Bebchuk and Cohen, management changes hands enough that one may not
expect this particular factor to be fixed over time.' Nonetheless, whether
one is considering managerial inclinations or some other omitted factor, it
is certainly plausible that some element of these firm-specific
characteristics do remain fixed over time. Such factors must be addressed
to ensure unbiased estimates.
It is possible that the unobservable individual effect is not correlated
with the right-hand side variables, in which case a fixed-effects (or"within") estimator is unnecessary and a random effects estimator would
given that (a) the two factors are correlated with each other, and (b) one of them remains
unobservable. To see this another way, consider a simplified version of the model: Qj.1999 = P3CBj
+ P2Xi.199 + 1i + ei,199 (for the year 1999) and Q.199o = J31CBj + 032Xi.1 o + ), + ei.19o (for the year
1990). Now, consider accounting for 1. in the 1999 specification by using Qi 19 as a proxy for
this measure. Since 1i and Qj.99 are not precisely equivalent, we impose a measurement error,
v,, in the the 1999 specificagtion by using Q.199o as a proxy, where vi =Xi - Q0990 (or -13CBi -
32X.19 - ei,199). The 1999 specification now looks like Q.1999 = PICBj + 2X.1999 + Q 1 M + ei.199+ v,. Including the components of vi, this becomes Qi.1999 = 12 (Xi.1999" Xi.199o) + Qi,199 + ei.19W -
e099o CB is now removed from the specification. Thus, using 1990 Q values to account for the
unobservable fixed factor still leaves us unable to estimate the coefficient of the classified board
variable. For a general discussion regarding dynamic panel data models (i.e., those that include
lagged dependent variables as covariates) and unobservable individual/firm effects, see Arellano
& Bond, supra note 52; STEPHEN BOND, DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODELS: A GUIDE TO MICRO
DATA METHODS AND PRACTICE (Ctr. for Microdata Methods and Practice Working Paper No.
CWP-09/02, 2002).
87"Within" estimation or "fixed effects" estimation entails transforming each observation
into deviations from individual/firm means. Thus, the resulting estimation makes use of within-
firm variation in the data.
88See, e.g., Himmelberg et al., supra note 31, at 357-58 (noting several sources of
unobserved fixed firm heterogeneity, including the quality of the owners' monitoring technology).
89See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 427-28 (noting that an unobservable firm
characteristic, such as a self-serving management, may have led both to a firm's decision to
establish a classified board prior to 1990 and to a low firm value throughout the 1990s).
9Id. at 428.
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generate more efficient estimates. As a first step, I run a Hausman
specification test9 to determine whether a fixed-effects model or a random
effects model should be employed and to test for the presence of an
individual fixed effect correlated with the regressors. Based on the results
of this test, I reject the hypothesis that the random effects estimator is
equivalent to the fixed-effects estimator, and thus, I reject the assumption
that there is no correlation between the classified board indicator (and the
other regressors) and an unobservable firm-fixed factor.
Instead of relying on pooled OLS estimates, I embrace the generous
tools provided by panel data and consequently run fixed-effects
specifications to control for unobserved factors. However, standard fixed-
effects estimators utilize variation within individual firms and not between
individual firms. That is, fixed-effects or "within" regression requires
transforming the data into deviations from individual means, essentially
annihilating time-invariant variables from the specification. While
classified boards are not perfectly time-invariant in the sample, the vast
majority of sample firms (95%) have fixed classified board status, in which
case a fixed-effects estimator significantly limits the amount of information
utilized to identify the impact of classified boards.
I hesitate to abandon the fixed-effects specification, however, given
the concern over unobservable factors. Thus, in order to generate unbiased
estimates, I explore the instrumental variables model developed by
Hausman and Taylor.92 With a clever approach, the Hausman-Taylor
estimator utilizes instruments from within the specification and allows for
the use of fixed-effects estimation without sacrificing identification of the
coefficients of the time-invariant variables.93
B. Hausman- Taylor Model
The Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables estimator entails using
some of the right-hand-side variables twice: once as instruments for
themselves (i.e., as control variables), and once as instruments for the time-
invariant variable (which, in the present specification, is the classified
board status).94 Hausman and Taylor consider a model very much like the
one specified above: Yit : I + +lit  P 3X2it + i + it ("equation 1 .,).95
That is, Hausman and Taylor separate the right-hand side variables into
91Jerry Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 ECONOMETRICA 1251 (1978).
92Hausman & Taylor, supra note 1, at 1378-79, 1383-89.
93See id.
94See id.
95See id. at 1379.
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three components: Z is a time-invariant variable that is correlated with the
individual effect, 1i; X, are time-varying regressors that are not correlated
with Xi (the "good" regressors); and X2 are time-varying regressors that are
correlated with Xi.9 6 The objective is to derive a consistent estimate of 3' .9
As can be seen, simply running a fixed-effects or "within" regression on
this model will annihilate Z and render estimation of 131 impossible. The
Hausman-Taylor model does make use of "within" estimation, but it
attempts to retain as much information as possible to identify all of the
desired coefficients.
The Hausman-Taylor estimator is equivalent to a two-stage least
squares regression of equation 1, using (QvXI, QX 2, PXI) as the set of
instruments, where QvM is the matrix M converted into deviations from
individual means and PM is the matrix M converted into individual
means.98 The estimator is quite intuitive. Essentially, in order to make the
most out of the available information within the panel, the estimator breaks
the "good" time-varying variables into two components: individual means
and deviation from individual means. The deviation from individual means
for the "good" variables can be used to instrument (i.e., control) for these"good" variables. The individual means are not necessary for these
purposes. Thus, the estimator sets aside this "extra" information and uses
it to instrument for the time-invariant variable. Assuming that certain
assumptions have been met, this approach allows for consistent estimation
of the coefficient of the time-invariant variable, while also controlling for
the presence of the unobservable individual effect.
The Hausman-Taylor approach is more easily explained by
considering a simplified, two-step variation of the above estimator. In the
first step, one runs a fixed-effects or "within" regression. Eliminating Ii
from the specification, this allows for consistent estimation of both P32 and
13. With consistent estimation of these coefficients, one then transforms
the model into the following: Di,= [31Zi + ,i + eit ("equation 2"), where (i)
Dit = Yit - *2Xlit - 13* 3X2it and (ii) 13*2 and 13*3 are the estimated
coefficients from this first step. Transforming the observations into
individual means, equation 2 becomes: Di. = lZi• + i + ei* ("equation 3"),
where D,. equals the average of the Dit values over all time periods (for
96See Hausman & Taylor, supra note 1, at 1379. Hausman and Taylor actually consider
four sets of covariates, where the fourth is a set of time-invariant variables that are not correlated
with the individual effects. See id. I ignore this fourth category for the purposes of this
illustration.
97An estimate of a particular parameter is said to be consistent if it converges in
probability to the true parameter value as the number of observations tends towards infinity.
98See Trevor S. Breusch et al., Efficient Estimation Using Panel Data, 57 ECONOMETRICA
695, 695-96 (1989).
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each individual firm i). In the second step, under the additional assumption
that X, and Z are correlated, one can now instrument Z with Xji. in
equation 3 to address the correlation between Z and 1i and derive consistent
estimates of the coefficient of the classified board indicator.99
The Hausman-Taylor methodology enhances the estimation of the
classified board coefficient by allowing one to make use of the variation in
classified board status across firms, as opposed to relying on the limited
variation within firms."° All that is needed is the existence of "good" time-
varying regressors-that is, regressors that are uncorrelated with the
unobservable individual effects. While this condition presents less of an
obstacle than that posed by ordinary instrumental variables, it is not
altogether easy to find variables capable of satisfying this requirement.
Fortunately, a benefit of the Hausman-Taylor model is that one is able to
test the assumption that the set of variables in X, is uncorrelated with the
individual effect, ki. Additionally, one may do this collectively for all of
the X, variables, as opposed to traditional specification tests, which only
test over-identifying restrictions. 01
Required for these purposes are factors correlated with the classified
board status but uncorrelated with the unobservable firm characteristic.
Many of the covariates will probably not fit this bill. Consider this
unobservable fixed factor as representing the degree to which management
is self-serving. Now, consider the fraction of shares held by insiders. It is
reasonable to believe that insider ownership may be connected to the
inclinations of management. Perhaps well-behaving managers wish to
signal their good nature to the market by holding more of the firm's shares.
In general, variables that represent firm-specific outcomes will likely
fail to satisfy the condition that they be uncorrelated with this firm-specific
fixed effect. Ideally, one would make use of variables that capture factors
out of the hands of the firm participants, such that there can be little
feedback between the firm-fixed effect and these other factors.
Consequently, I explore the age of the firm as the X, variable (i.e., the"good" time-varying variable) for this Hausman-Taylor analysis.
99See Hausman & Taylor, supra note 1, at 1383. As indicated previously, X1 j, is
uncorrelated with Ii. See supra Part IV.B. Thus, X,. is uncorrelated with 1j, as required toperform instrumental variables regression. A necessary condition for identification of P, is that
the number of columns in X, must be at least as great as the number of columns in Z. See id. In
other words, the number of time-varying regressors not correlated with the individual effect must
be at least as great as the number of time-invariant variables.
"'°Consistent estimation of the classified board coefficient under this approach will not
be impacted by the small amount of time variation in classified board status within firms. The
identification assumptions of the Hausman-Taylor instruments still hold.
'0'See Hausman & Taylor, supra note 1, at 1388-89.
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It is reasonable to assume that a firm's age or experience is correlated
with the classified board decision, particularly in light of the arguments
made by Bebchuk and Cohen concerning the difficulties in modifying
classified board status following 1990. 02 The development of shareholder
uneasiness concerning classified boards, combined with the agenda-setting
powers provided to boards of directors, creates a specific link between
classified board status and firm age.
Furthermore, the age of a firm may be uncorrelated with the
unobservable fixed characteristic, allowing firm age to satisfy the necessary
identification conditions under the Hausman-Taylor model. First of all, this
intrinsic characteristic should not be impacted by increases in firm age. As
the firm ages, this fixed characteristic, by nature, does not change. Of
course, there may be reason to be concerned with cohort effects.'0 3
Consider the firm-fixed effect as representing the self-serving inclinations
of management. Different generations of firms may have different ranges
of self-serving tendencies. To alleviate concerns over generational bias, I
limit the regressions to those firms that entered the CRSP monthly database
after 1973 (i.e., those firms under thirty years of age). 4 Focusing on this
time period will still capture the transformation from little resistance to
significant resistance in enacting classified boards, and, thus, should still
pick up meaningful correlation between age and classified board status.
Additionally, unlike the case with other covariates, such as the share
of insider ownership, there is not likely to be much feedback in the other
direction-from the firm-fixed factor to firm age-considering that such
fixed characteristics cannot alter the course of time. Of course, feedback
may work in this direction under a survivorship story. 5 However, limiting
the sample to those firms under thirty years of age will also alleviate any
survivorship bias. Moreover, any correlation between the firm-fixed effect
"°See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 426 (noting shareholders' reluctance after
1990 to approve charter-based provisions creating staggered boards).
"°3See Hausman & Taylor, supra note 1, at 1393.
lThe results presented below are relatively robust to this precise age cut-off (particularly
with respect to the sign of the estimated coefficients). Even within this thirty-year period, the
possibility remains that firms incorporated at the beginning of the period differ fundamentally in
their self-serving inclinations. Nonetheless, in taking this approach, I do alleviate concerns over
cohort bias driven by those firms that have been around for a significant period of time (well over
the thirty-year mark). In any case, these fixed factors are meant to represent the kinds of
structures or impulses that are likely to be present in all generations. Moreover, while different
cohorts may face different levels of resistance to these inherent impulses, the immediate focus
here is on capturing the impulse itself and not on capturing the means by which the firms can act
on that impulse (which are addressed by the use of other control variables).
"°5That is, if self-serving managers cause firms to have a higher probability of failure,
then those firms that survive may have a distinct set of managerial inclinations.
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and firm age attributable to a survivorship story would likely generate a
positive bias in the estimated classified board coefficient."° Thus, the fact
that negative coefficients are estimated in the face of a potential positive
bias only lends support to the conclusion that classified boards suppress
firm value.
Table II presents the results of Hausman-Taylor estimation using
firm age and its square as X, (i.e., the set of time-varying variables that are
uncorrelated with the firm-fixed effect). The results largely confirm the
findings of Bebchuk and Cohen. °7 That is, I document a negative
relationship between classified board status and firm value. This
relationship is statistically significant in most of the specifications explored
in this section. Column 1 presents results using industry-adjusted Q as the
dependent variable. The estimated coefficient on the classified board
variable is -0.9; this estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level.'08
Running a generalized Hausman specification test,'09 I fail to reject the
assumption that firm age and its square are uncorrelated with the firm-fixed
effect. Column 2 of Table II presents results using charter-based classified
boards in place of the general classified board indicator. The estimated
coefficient on this more limited classified board variable is -1.0; this
estimate is significant at 5%. In column 3, I replace industry-adjusted Q
with regular Tobin's Q values and control for industry effects using industry
dummies. The estimated coefficient of the classified board indicator
remains negative in value (-0.8) and is significant at 10%.
In various unreported regressions, I run additional specification
checks on the above results. First, when I limit the sample to those firms
in the post-1995 period, the estimated coefficient of the classified board
indicator becomes -1.0 and remains significant at 5%.10 Second, the
l°6Attributing positive values of Xi to "good" managerial inclinations, one might expect
a positive correlation between Xi and firm age under this survivorship story. With this positive
correlation, the coefficient generated by the Hausman-Taylor model would be biased in a positive
direction.
'07Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 420-24.
'°8For the reported results, I estimate the coefficients under the instrumental variables
interpretation of the Hausman-Taylor estimator. In unreported regressions, I generate efficient
or "optimal" instrumental-variables estimates by estimating the variance-covariance matrix and
then transforming the specification, such that the transformed error term has a scalar variance-
covariance matrix. See Breusch et al., supra note 98, at 696. The reported results are robust to
this exercise.
'°9Hausman & Taylor, supra note 1, at 1388-89.
" he impact of classified boards may have changed significantly following 1995 as a
result of the developments in Delaware case law, which solidified the combined use of classified
boards and poison pills to fight proxy contests. See, e.g., Moore Corp. Ltd. v.Wallace Computer
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995). Thus, as a specification check, I run the model
using a sample that is confined to these years. However, there may be little benefit in isolating
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results from column 1 are virtually unchanged (1) when the "entrenchment"
index and the "other-provisions" index"' are used instead of the adjusted
GIM Index, and (2) when this "entrenchment" index is replaced with a set
of indicator variables for each of its separate provisions. This latter
specification avoids some of the limitations that inhere in an index
approach and controls more flexibly for the precise components of the
firm's governance portfolio. Third, using the ratio of research and
development expenses to sales as a proxy for growth opportunities in place
of the growth rate in sales, the estimated negative effect of classified boards
on industry-adjusted Q increases to -1.2; this estimate is significant at 5%.
Finally, using the log of Tobin's Q to alleviate the influence of outlying
observations, the estimated association between classified boards and firm
value remains negative but is no longer statistically significant.
Column 5 of Table II presents results of Amemiya-MaCurdy
estimation" 2 of the effect of classified boards on industry-adjusted Q. The
Amemiya-MaCurdy model makes use of a greater range of the X, values to
identify the coefficient of the time-invariant variable, as opposed tojust the
individual means of the X, variables, as is the case with the Hausman-
Taylor estimator." 3 This approach, however, requires a slightly stronger
exogeneity assumption. Hausman and Taylor only required that the means
of X, be uncorrelated with the individual effects. In contrast, Amemiya and
MaCurdy require that X, be uncorrelated with the individual effect at every
point in time." 4  Of course, as Amemiya and MaCurdy discuss, the
conditions of their model will hold generally in the same set of instances
that the conditions of the Hausman-Taylor model will hold."5 Under the
Ameniya-MaCurdy approach, the estimated coefficient of the classified
board variable remains negative at -1.0; however, the estimate is not
significantly different from 0.116
the sample to the post-1995 period, given that I include year dummies to control for fixed
differences across years in the effects of classified boards.
..see BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 40, at 6-11.
"2 Takeshi Amemiya & Thomas E. MaCurdy, Instrumental-Variable Estimation of an
Error-Components Model, 54 ECONOMETRICA 869, 872-77 (1986).
113Hausman and Taylor use X, as two instruments: first as deviation from individual
means (QXI), and then as individual time means (PX,). Breusch et al., supra note 98, at 697-98.
Amemiya and MaCurdy use X, as T+1 instruments: first as deviations from individual means,
and then as one instrument for each of the T time periods. Id.
11 'Id. at 698.
'5See Amemiya & MaCurdy, supra note 112, at 877.
"'The Amemiya-MaCurdy estimator also requires a balanced panel data set. Thus, for
the purposes of this estimator, I limit the sample to those firms that are represented in all IRRC
volumes.
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Despite some variation in the level of significance, the negative
relationship between Tobin's Q and classified boards is relatively consistent
across the numerous specifications described above. To the extent that the
experience of those firms under thirty years of age may generalize to the
full sample, this evidence supports the results found by Bebchuk and Cohen
that classified boards may lead to a reduction in firm value."'
Column 1 of Table II also presents the estimated coefficients of the
control variables used in the primary regression. The adjusted GIM Index
has a negative and statistically significant effect (at 5%) on industry-
adjusted Q with a coefficient of -0.2. Firm age has a negative and
significant relationship with firm value, as does the leverage ratio and
Delaware incorporation. Return-on-assets and the capital expenditures-
asset ratio have a positive and significant effect on industry-adjusted Q.
These results are relatively consistent across the range of specifications.
The sales growth rate, the incidence of large institutional shareholders, and
the share of insider ownership have insignificant associations with firm
value.
To illustrate the impact of the Hausman-Taylor approach, in column
4, I present the results of a pooled OLS regression of industry-adjusted Q
on classified board status, the set of covariates used above, and a set of year
dummies, without controlling for firm-fixed effects. Similar to the findings
of Bebchuk and Cohen, the estimated coefficient is negative and significant
at 5%.'18 The magnitude of the effect on firm value (-0.05), however, is
much smaller than the Hausman-Taylor estimates above. Indeed, the
Hausman-Taylor estimates are perhaps implausibly large, suggesting that
the underlying model itself (see equation *** above) may be misspecified.
Encouragingly, based on a generalized Hausman test, I fail to reject the
identification assumptions of the Hausman-Taylor model. However, such
a test only evaluates the correlation between the instruments and the
omitted fixed effect. The possibility remains that other misspecifications
persist in the underlying model. In any case, given the potential for omitted
firm effects, one should be just as suspicious of the pooled OLS regression
results. Moreover, the consistent findings throughout this article of a
negative relationship between firm value and classified board status, even
if implausibly large, still provide some probative evidence against the claim
that classified boards increase, rather than decrease, the value of firms.
.. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 420-24.
"8 d.
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V. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE MODEL
Motivating the above section was the desire to account for
unobservable factors that could lead to bias in estimating the effect of
classified boards on firm value. Panel data techniques are powerful in this
regard. In this section, I take an alternative approach towards the same goal
by making use of natural experiment methodologies common to the labor
and public economics literature. Exploiting several sources of variation in
the data, I attempt to remove the influence of certain unobservable factors
by constructing a variation on the difference-in-difference-in-difference
(DDD) estimator recently employed by Rauh." 9
The DDD specification explored in this section utilizes one source
of variation that is arguably exogenous to the model: the mid-1990s
transformation in Delaware case law. During this time period, the outcome
of several takeover contests involving Delaware firms (i.e., Younkers,
Wallace Computer, and Circon) legitimized the ability of managers in firms
with staggered boards to continue to assert poison pills after having lost the
first round of a proxy contest. 120 This stamp of approval strengthened the
classified board/poison pill combination and opened the door for classified
boards to affect firm behavior in a meaningful fashion. Following Rauh,
I treat this transformation in the legal environment as a natural experiment
by which to test the impact of classified boards.12' I mark 1995 as the point
of transformation given that the Delaware District Court decided Wallace122
in that year, representing the only case law generated by the trilogy of
takeover contests. 23 More generally, the Delaware Supreme Court's 1995
Unitrin decision1 24 solidified the ability of managers to maintain poison
pills over indefinite periods of time. 125 This decision also strengthened the
potential impact of classified boards, given that the power of such
structures derives largely from their combined use with poison pills. 126
Studies implementing natural experiment methodologies often rely
on changes in legislative or regulatory positions over time. These
approaches are vulnerable to legislative endogeneity concerns. The first
"'See Rauh, supra note 2, at 392-93, 399-401 (using a DDD model to estimate the impact
of classified boards on employee ownership of own-company stock).
12 0See Subramanian, supra note 17, at 52-53.
...See Rauh, supra note 2, at 392-93, 399-401.
22Moore Corp. Ltd. v.Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
...See Subramanian, supra note 17, at 54.
24Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
'"Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 412.
1261d.
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source of concern is the potential for reincorporation by firms. Since
reincorporations were relatively rare over the applicable time period, and
since such events require stockholder approval, commentators have argued
that the possibility of reincorporations pose few endogeneity concerns.'27
The second source of concern is perhaps more troubling: in passing
legislation or regulations, policymakers are typically acting in response to
the interests of those parties whose behavior is being studied. This creates
a link between firm/individual characteristics and the legislative
environment, leading to potential biases. Changes in legal environments
attributable to the judiciary, such as those utilized in this article, are less
prone to this source of bias. In comparison with legislation, judicial
decisions are arguably less influenced by the specific interests of the
managers and firms represented in our sample.
I estimate the following DDD model:
Qit = Ce + P3Xit + P2CBit + P3DELit + 04POSTit + 15(POSTit * DEL) +
P6(POSTit * CBi) + 037(CBit * DELit) + P8(POSTit * DELit * CBi) + 't + smte
+ aindustry+  it
where X is a set of covariates (adjusted GIM Index, firm age, firm size,
capital expenditures-asset ratio, leverage, return-on-assets, sales growth
rate, insider ownership share, and the incidence of large institutional
shareholders). CB is the predicted likelihood of having a classified board.
DEL is an indicator for Delaware incorporation. POST is an indicator for
years after 1995.
The coefficient of interest is 138. It captures the isolated effect of
classified boards on firm value. 21 It differs from the DDD coefficient
estimated by Rauh 129 in that, instead of taking the difference between firms
127See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 8, at 668.
2 'he magnitude of the triple-differences coefficient, P3, may not capture the precise
magnitude of the effect of classified boards on firm value (in an absolute sense), given that (a)
classified boards may still have had some effect on firm value, albeit a lesser effect, prior to the
transformation in Delaware law, and (b) firms incorporated in states other than Delaware may still
have responded to the transformation in Delaware law, albeit to a lesser extent. Nonetheless,
given that the effect of classified boards should be more pronounced in the post-1995 period and
given that the effect of the mid- 1990s transformation in Delaware law should be more pronounced
for firms incorporated in Delaware, the triple-differences coefficient should still capture the sign
of the relationship between classified boards and firm value and, thus, should still provide insight
on the question of whether classified boards enhance or suppress firm value. In regard to
magnitude, the coefficient should indicate the differential effect on firm value of the mid- 1990s
validation of the classified board/poison pill combination for Delaware firms relative to non-
Delaware firms.
129See Rauh, supra note 2, at 399-400.
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with and without classified boards, I form the predicted likelihood of
having a classified board and then interact this variable with the POST *
DEL interaction. The following discussion offers a more thorough
illustration of the mechanics behind this approach.
I begin with the consideration of a simple difference-in-difference
(DD) model which is estimated as follows: (1) calculate the difference in
Tobin's Q values between firms with classified boards and firms without
classified boards, and then (2) calculate the difference in this difference
between observations in the post-1995 period and observations in the pre-
1995 period. Essentially, whatever the initial difference was between the
Q values of firms with and without classified boards, one should expect this
difference to magnify (or contract) in the post-1995 period, given that the
transformation in Delaware law only affected the "treatment" group (i.e.,
those with classified boards). Given Bebchuk and Cohen's arguments as to
the difficulty in modifying classified board status throughout the 1990s, 130
those firms with classified boards can be viewed as the "treatment" group
for this natural experiment with little concern as to firms modifying
classified board status in response to the change in law. 3 ' This simple
approach eliminates the effects of certain unobservable factors. The first
layer of differences (pre- and post-1995) removes any fixed differences in
firm value between firms with and without classified boards. The second
layer of differences (classified board/lack of classified board) removes the
effects of any aggregate economic shocks that hit the system in the post-
1995 period. However, this DD model does not identify the true effect of
classified boards to the extent that there are any shocks specific to firms
with classified boards in the post-1995 period. In this case, the DD
calculation may be picking up the effect of these unobservable shocks
instead of the effect of classified boards.
To eliminate the effects of these CB/POST-specific shocks, I
construct the DDD estimator specified above and consider an additional
level of variation: Delaware incorporation versus non-Delaware
incorporation. 13 2 For two reasons, one should expect classified boards to
have more of an impact, in the post-1995 period relative to the pre-1995
period, on firms incorporated in Delaware than on firms incorporated
elsewhere. First and foremost, Delaware's 1995 transformation directly
3'See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 426.
'See Rauh, supra note 2, at 381.
13 2The general DDD methodology is motivated by Gruber. Jonathan H. Gruber, The
Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 622, 627 (1994). The specific
DDD model employed in this paper is motivated by Rauh. See Rauh, supra note 2, at 399.
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affected firms covered under Delaware corporate law. 133  Second,
considering that the entrenchment power of classified boards derives
primarily from their combined use with poison pills (i.e., the two provisions
together significantly inhibit any attempt at engaging in a proxy contest to
remove management), Delaware firms may experience a relatively greater
impact from the validation of the classified board/poison pill combination
since Delaware authorized relatively potent poison pills (though not the
most potent pills) throughout the sample period."3
Consequently, taking this third layer of difference (Delaware
incorporation versus non-Delaware incorporation) should isolate the impact
of classified boards, under the assumption that any shocks specific to the
CB/POST firms do not differ across Delaware and non-Delaware
incorporation. That is, the model is identified, unless there are factors that
are specific to that set of observations that (1) have a classified board, (2)
are incorporated in Delaware, and (3) are in the post-1995 period. In
addition to accounting for any effects specific to classified board firms in
the post-1995 period (see P6), the DDD specification also accounts for
factors specific to (1) Delaware firms in the post-1995 period (135), and (2)
Delaware firms with classified boards (37).
The only concern at this point is the endogenous relationship
between classified boards and the state of incorporation. If classified board
status is endogenous to the state of incorporation, then there are likely to
be factors specific to Delaware firms with classified boards for which the
specification does not control and that may also be driving firm value. Of
course, when one takes the difference before and after 1995, the effect of
such factors may be removed. Any such endogenous relationship, however,
may increase the chance that other shocks hit Delaware firms with
classified boards contemporaneously with the transformation in Delaware
'33Of course, firms incorporated in other states may still feel an impact from Delaware's
decision, given the assumption that their courts may follow Delaware's lead. However, the
uncertainty inherent in this assumption should lead to a weaker impact in comparison with
Delaware-incorporated firms.
"Certain states, however, authorize poison pills that are more potent than those in
Delaware, including Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and Georgia. Subramanian, supra note
8, at 625-29. Nonetheless, considering that the transformation in Delaware law directly impacted
Delaware firms and that the Delaware pills are stronger than those for many states, the crude
difference between Delaware firms and non-Delaware firms should still pick up a difference in
the likely impact of Delaware's validation of the classified board/poison pill combination.
Moreover, in alternative specifications, I run the same DDD model, but instead of looking across
Delaware and non-Delaware firms, I take the difference across two groups: one consisting of
firms incorporated in Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania and the other
group consisting of firms incorporated in the remaining states. As discussed later in Part V, the
results are robust to this alternative specification.
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law, thereby creating a bias in the DDD estimate. To address this concern,
instead of using a firm's actual classified board status, I follow Gruber and
Mullainathan and use each firm's predicted likelihood of having a classified
board.'3 5 I generate these predictions using the coefficients derived from
annual regressions of classified board status on a set of observable
predictors. I form the applicable set of predictor variables using the
covariates employed in the primary DDD specification. I then interact the
predicted likelihood with an indicator for Delaware incorporation and an
indicator for the post-1995 period. The coefficient of this interaction, P8,
is our measure of interest.
In Table ll, I present the results of the DDD model specified above.
In each regression, I use regular Tobin's Q values as the dependent variable
and control for industry effects by including a full set of industry dummies.
In each regression, I also run year-fixed effects and state-fixed effects and
include controls for firm age, firm size, return-on-assets, insider ownership
share, capital expenditures-assets ratio, leverage, sales growth rate, and the
incidence of large institutional shareholders. As reported in column 1, I
estimate a triple-differences coefficient, P., of -0.47; this estimate is
statistically significant at 1%. Thus, I find that the mid-1990s change in
Delaware law had a negative effect on firm value for those Delaware firms
likely to have classified boards. This coefficient can be interpreted as a
negative effect of classified board status on firm value. These results
remain unchanged when I replace the adjusted GIM Index with the two sub-
indices: the "entrenchment" index and the "other-provisions" index. The
same is true when I replace this "entrenchment" index score with a set of
dummy variables capturing each of the separate provisions of this subindex.
For the regressions reported in columns 1 and 3-5 of Table I, I use
Huber-White sandwich estimators to form heteroskedasticity-consistent
estimates of the standard errors.136 In column 2 of Table III, I run the same
regression from column 1, but I make a standard-error correction to allow
for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each state of
incorporation. 37  With this correction, the estimated triple-differences
135See Jonathan H. Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers
Happier?, 5 ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POLY 1, 2 (2005) (using predicted smoking
likelihoods, as opposed to actual smoking status, in order to alleviate endogeneity between
smoking status and excise tax rates).
136See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 418.
137Estimating grouped error terms by clustering the standard errors in this manner may
be advised, given that the unit of observation in the data (i.e., firm/year) is more detailed than one
of the levels of variation exploited in the specification (i.e., incorporation in Delaware). See
Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119
Q. J. ECON. 249,254,270-72 (2004). The results reported in column 1 of Table III are also robust
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coefficient of -0.47 continues to be statistically significant but only at the
10% level.
Column 3 modifies the specification from column 1 to replace the
general classified board variable with an indicator variable for charter-
based classified boards (that is, the specification uses the predicted
likelihood of having a charter-based classified board). The estimated 138
coefficient is -0.37 (significant at 5%). The above findings are also robust
to the use of actual classified board status, as opposed to the predicted
likelihood of having a classified board. Making this substitution, I estimate
138 at -0.28 (significant at 1%), as reported in column 4.
In column 5 of Table EI, the sample is limited to those firms that
went public prior to the mid-1990s transformation in Delaware law. As
discussed above, those firms with classified boards can be viewed as the
"treatment" group with little concern as to modification of classified board
status in response to the change in Delaware law. 38 However, some
concern still remains with respect to those firms that had initial public
offerings (IPOs) in the years following this legal transformation. To
alleviate any bias caused by such firms, I remove from the model any firm
that went public in the years following this transformation. The estimated
triple-differences coefficient under this approach remains similar in
magnitude at -0.39 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, the
above DDD findings appear to be robust to concerns over the invalidation
of the "treatment" group due to IPOs in the sample period.
In an unreported regression, I also explore an alternative DDD model
where, instead of looking at differences between firms incorporated in
Delaware and firms incorporated outside of Delaware, I take the difference
between firms incorporated in the group of states consisting of Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and Georgia and firms incorporated
elsewhere. This particular group of states authorizes the most potent
poison pills and should thus feel the strongest impact of classified boards
on firm value.'39 This alternative model assumes that these additional states
will still be affected, to some extent, by the transformation in Delaware
case law. The estimated triple-differences coefficient under this approach
is also negative (-0.42) and significant at the 5% level.
to the clustering of the standard errors on the incidence of Delaware incorporation (as opposed
to clustering on each state of incorporation). However, these latter results should be interpreted
with caution because clustering techniques perform poorly when the number of groups used is
small. See id. at 269.
'38See Rauh, supra note 2, at 381.
139See Subramanian, supra note 8, at 628.
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Finally, in additional unreported regressions, I test the robustness of
the above findings to certain functional form assumptions. First, using
industry-adjusted Tobin's Q in place of regular Q values and a set of
industry dummies, the triple-differences coefficient is estimated at -0.31;
this estimate is significant at 10%. In any case, regular Q values and a set
of industry dummies, as used above, allow for a more complete control of
fixed differences across industries. Second, to alleviate the influence of
outliers, I also run the above model using the log of Tobin's Q as the
dependent variable and find a triple differences coefficient of -0.14
(significant at 5%). Third, when I modify the set of control variables to
include the squares of all continuous variables (as opposed to just the levels
of such variables), I estimate the triple-differences coefficient at -0.39; this
estimate is significant at 5%.
The results derived from DDD estimation present relatively
consistent evidence of a negative and economically meaningful association
between classified boards and firm value. While, as in Part LV.B., it could
be argued that the estimated results are implausibly large,"4 the results,
nonetheless, lend further support against any claim that classified boards
enhance firm value. One question that remains, however, is whether this
negative association is homogenous across all levels of firm value or
whether this relationship differs along the distribution of value.
VI. QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
As a final robustness exercise, I run quantile regressions of industry-
adjusted Tobin's Q on classified board status. Originally proposed by
Koenker and Basset, quantile regressions provide estimates that are robust
to some of the functional form assumptions typically taken in other
estimation models.' 4' Particularly, quantile regressions allow relaxation of
the assumption of a normally distributed error process and are less sensitive
to outlying observations. 142 Consequently, such regressions provide a
welcome robustness check to the estimation procedures explored in Parts
IV and V above.
An additional advantage of the quantile regression model for the
purposes of this study is that it provides a method of modeling
heterogeneous effects of a variable along different points of an outcome
distribution. That is, the approach allows for estimation of the association
"4 The estimated triple-differences coefficient of -0.47 is substantial in relation to the
average Tobin's Q value of 1.85.
141Koenker & Bassett, supra note 24, at 33-34, 38.
142See id.
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between classified boards and firm value, not only in the middle of the
distribution of firm value, but also at the tails.'43 Conventional regression
models generate mean results that assume the regressors affect the
dependent variable to the same extent across all points of the outcome
distribution.' Estimating mean effects may often generate useful
information; however, in many cases, it is far more interesting to tell a
more complete story by estimating the full distributional impact.'45 In the
present governance study, estimating the effects of classified boards
throughout the distribution of firm values may offer some additional insight
into the question of whether classified boards are wholly negative for firms,
or whether such devices generate some positive contributions to firm value.
Based on the above findings, it may be safe to assume that classified
boards depress firm value on average. It remains possible, however, that
this negative association does not arise in those firms with low levels of
Tobin's Q. One element to the relationship between classified boards and
firm value which is likely to vary across the distribution of Tobin's Q is the
probability of takeover. That is, firms with low Q values may be more
likely takeover targets.'46 This possibility, combined with the notion that
classified boards provide directors with the power to reject and defend
value-enhancing acquisition attempts, ' may support the general finding of
a negative relationship between classified boards and firm value. However,
managers of low-value firms may also face a stronger short-term bias as a
result of the greater likelihood of takeover.'48 In such firms, classified
boards may be beneficial to firm value to the extent the insulation afforded
by such devices allows managers and directors to focus on long-term
strategy. These considerations may not arise to the same degree in firms
on the upper tail of the value distribution where takeover odds are not as
high.
Therefore, to the extent the quantile regression results illustrate a
stronger negative effect at the upper tail of the value distribution in relation
'43Chaudhuri et al., supra note 24, at 715; VICTOR CHERNOZHUKOV & CHRISTIAN
HANSEN, INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE QUANTILE REGRESSION 2 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Working
Paper No. 06-19, 2004), available at http:llpapers.ssm.con/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=909666.
t'"CHERNOZHUKOV & HANSEN, supra note 143, at 2.
145See id. For instance, in an evaluation of the effect of health outcomes on income,
policymakers may be far more interested in looking at the effect at the low end of the income
distribution.
146See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 AM.
ECON. REv., 842, 850 (1989) (finding evidence that low industry-adjusted Tobin's Q values are
associated with a higher probability of hostile takeovers).
147See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 40, at 890.
148See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1011.
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to the lower tail of such distribution, it could be argued that, even though
classified boards reduce firm value on average, these devices, nonetheless,
generate offsetting benefits to shareholders in certain circumstances.
To explore these considerations, I estimate the following linear
conditional quantile function:
MQIXCB(m) = 13 (m)X+132(m)CB
where M Q XCB (in) is the m-th quantile of Tobin's Q, conditional on the set
of covariates. The scalar m takes on values between 0 and 1. Essentially,
the m-th quantile of a variable Z is the level of Z representing the m-th
percentile (i.e., the probability that Z is less than the m-th quantile equals
rn).'49 Using quantile regressions, I estimate 132(m), which captures the
effect of classified boards on the m-th quantile of firm value. In essence,
this coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of having a classified board
on firm value for those firms at the m-th percentile of the value
distribution. 5 Estimating these coefficients for a range of m values allows
for a more complete understanding of the impact of classified boards.
Quantile regressions estimate 13(m) = (13(m), 132(m)) by solving the
following minimization problem:
Min E m IQi - Xip(m) I + E (I -m)I Qi - i[3(m)I
P * (mn) i : Qi iO i: Q < Xi[P
where [3*(m) is the estimate of P(m), and X is the full set of regressors (X,
and CB). 5' In taking this approach, some of the virtues of the other
specifications explored in this article must be sacrificed. Mainly, I cannot
run quantile regressions while also employing the instrumental variables
strategies of Part IV in an effort to account for firm-fixed effects. While
econometricians have developed instrumental variables quantile regression
models,152 the instrumental variables methods employed in Part IV of this
article require the transformation of certain variables into deviations from
their mean values. "Differencing" approaches of this nature cannot be
149More formally, the m-th quantile of a variable Z is defined as follows: M z (in) = inf{z:
Fz (z) > m), where Fz (z) is the distribution function for Z. See, e.g., Chaudhuri et al., supra note
24, at 715.50See, e.g., Roger Koenker & Kevin F. Hallock, Quantile Regression, 15 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 143, 149 (2001) (estimating the effect of various demographics on birth weight
quantiles).
"'See Koenker & Bassett, supra note 24, at 38.
112See, e.g., CHERNOZHUKOV & HANSEN, supra note 143, at 3-8.
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employed in connection with nonlinear estimation procedures such as
quantile regressions. 15 3
Despite limitations in the ability to control for unobservable factors,
this quantile regression exercise should be of some analytical value given
the ability to explore distributional implications. Row 1 of Table IV
presents the results of quantile regressions of classified board status on
industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. In each regression, I control for the same set
of covariates employed in Part IV. I also control for year-fixed effects.
The coefficients reported in columns 1 through 9 indicate the estimated
effect of classified boards on the 0.1 through 0.9 conditional quantiles of
industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, respectively. The results suggest that
classified boards have no effect, or a slightly positive effect, on firm value
at the lower tail of the distribution of firm value. The effect becomes more
negative as one moves up this value distribution. At the upper quantiles of
firm value, classified boards have a strong negative effect on firm value.
Using the general classified board variable, the estimated effect of
classified boards on the 0.1 and 0.2 quantiles is 0.04 and 0.03, respectively
(significant at 5% and 1%, respectively). The estimated effect falls and
turns negative at the 0.5 quantile. The estimate does not reach a
statistically significant negative value until the 0.6 quantile. At the 0.9
quantile, I estimate the coefficient on classified board status at -0.18; this
estimate is significant at 1%. For purposes of comparison, column 4 of
Table II presents the results of a pooled OLS regression of classified board
status on industry-adjusted Q, using an identical set of controls. As
indicated above, I estimate a mean effect of classified boards of -0.05.
This pattern does not change substantially when the general
classified board variable is replaced with an indicator for the presence of
a charter-based classified board, as indicated by row 2 of Table V. The
estimated coefficient on classified board status decreases monotonically as
one ascends the distribution of firm value. However, for the 0.1 to 0.4
quantiles, the estimate is not significantly different from 0. For the 0.5 to
0.9 quantiles, the estimated effect of classified boards is negative and
statistically significant (at the 5% level for the 0.5-0.6 quantiles and at the
1% level for the 0.7-0.9 quantiles).
These results are robust to the following alternative treatments of the
remaining governance provisions: (1) controlling for the "entrenchment"
153Furthermore, estimation techniques in nonlinear models that attempt to account for
individual/firm heterogeneity by directly estimating the individual/firm effects (as opposed to
"differencing" out such effects) may result in inconsistent estimates, due to the "incidental
parameters problem." See, e.g., Tony Lancaster, The Incidental Parameter Problem Since 1948,
95 J. ECONOMETRICS 391, 394 (2000).
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and "other-provisions" indices (and their squares) and (2) controlling for
the "other-provisions" index (and its square), while controlling separately
for the components of the "entrenchment" index. Moreover, these
distributional findings persist when the sample is limited to those
observations in the post- 1995 period.'54
Offering the benefits of a robust estimation technique that allows for
the relaxation of certain functional form assumptions, these results
generally support the findings presented in Parts IV and V that classified
boards suppress firm value.'55 The results derived from quantile
regressions, however, suggest that these negative effects are concentrated
along the upper portion of the distribution of firm value. At low levels of
Tobin's Q, the association between classified boards and firm value is either
negligible or positive in sign, supporting the possibility that classified
boards, in certain circumstances, actually generate countervailing benefits
to shareholder wealth.
However, the estimated effects of classified boards on the 0.1-0.2
quantiles may not be due to an offsetting of certain positive and negative
forces as hypothesized above. Rather, the fact that little or no association
between classified boards and firm value is estimated at low Tobin's Q
levels could simply arise from the possibility that firms with low Tobin's
Q face greater pressure to behave properly. With weak investment
opportunities, managers and directors may have less leeway to extract
private benefits and engage in other destructive behaviors. Consequently,
the entrenchment afforded by classified boards may be immaterial at the
low tail of the value distribution. However, considering the various ways
in which classified boards may affect firms likely to be taken over, such as
firms with low Tobin's Q values, it is more likely that the lack of an
estimated association between classified boards and firm value for low-Q
firms results from an aggregation of both positive and negative forces. This
supposition is supported by the fact that positive coefficients are estimated
in some of the low-quantile specifications explored above.
Accordingly, while the positive effects of classified boards are, on
average, overwhelmed by the negative, the quantile regression results,
nonetheless, suggest that some positive forces do exist and that such forces
may even outweigh the negative in certain circumstances. That is, the
'54Moreover, I also explore a specification that replaces industry-adjusted Tobin's Q with
regular Q values and a full set of industry dummies. The estimator, however, does not converge
for all quantiles under this approach. Nonetheless, for those estimators that do converge, the
findings correspond with the results observed above.
15See supra Parts IV & V.
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general findings do not necessarily support a complete rejection of the
notion that classified boards benefit shareholders.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sound empirical analysis is required to shed light on the ambiguities
that pervade corporate governance theory. The motivation of this article
has been to draw on numerous econometric tools to address some of the
empirical obstacles facing the corporate governance literature. One of the
major limitations of recent studies has been the inability to account for
unobservable factors that are correlated with both firm valuation and
corporate governance structures. Omissions of this nature leave empirical
specifications vulnerable to potentially large estimation biases.
In this study, I have embraced the panel nature of the IRRC dataset
in an attempt to explore the relationship between classified boards and firm
value, while accounting for unobservable fixed characteristics of firms. To
address the dilemma posed by running a fixed effects model on a virtually
time-invariant variable (i.e., classified board status), I have employed the
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables estimator. 56 The results of this
exercise generally support the findings of Bebchuk and Cohen that
classified boards are associated with a reduction in Tobin's Q.'57
While these approaches may account for potential correlation
between classified boards and unobservablefixed characteristics of firms,
the estimates may still be biased to the extent that classified boards or any
of the covariates are correlated with contemporaneous shocks to the system.
The generous tools provided by panel data may be beneficial in this regard
as well. In future work, I hope to structure a dynamic panel data model that
synthesizes the Hausman-Taylor model and the Generalized Methods of
Moments estimator employed by Arellano and Bond' to control more
comprehensively for correlations between the regressors and unobservable
fixed factors, and between the regressors and the contemporaneous error
term.
Taking an alternative "differencing" approach to the removal of
unobservable factors, I have treated Delaware's mid-1990s validation of the
classified board/poison pill combination as a natural experiment by which
to construct a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimator. The
results derived from this DDD specification again suggest that classified
boards may be associated with a reduction in firm value. Moreover,
156Hausman & Taylor, supra note 1, at 1384-89.
157Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 18, at 420-24.
' 15 Arellano & Bond, supra note 52, at 278-81.
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employing quantile regressions to explore the possibility of heterogeneous
impacts of classified boards along the full distribution of firm value, I have
found that this negative relationship is likely concentrated along the upper
tail of the value distribution. For the least valuable firms, I have
documented no association, or perhaps a slight positive association,
between classified boards and firm value. Such results suggest that
classified boards may generate countervailing benefits in certain
circumstances, despite leading to a reduction in value on average.
While the negative findings reported in Parts IV and V are robust to
a range of specification checks and lend support against any argument that
classified boards, on average, enhance firm value, the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients are at a level that may be difficult for many to
believe. Any doubts as to the plausibility of such magnitudes, however,
should not lead one to place unbridled confidence in the findings reported
in the literature to date. For the reasons set forth in this article, the
estimates generated by such studies remain vulnerable to numerous omitted
variables concerns. To provide policymakers, boards of directors, and
investors with proper, unbiased guidance, the corporate governance
literature must continue to address sources of misspecification in its
underlying models, as I have attempted to do in this article. Only with
convincing empirical methodologies can we generate the tools with which
decisionmakers can structure effective, value-maximizing corporate
governance regimes.
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TABLE I: SUMMARY STATISTICS
This table presents the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the
variables used throughout this article. Tobin's Q equals the ratio of the market
value of assets to the book value of assets (where the market value of assets is
determined according to the formula specified in Part III). GIM Index equals the
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance index, adjusted to exclude classified
boards. Firm age is determined according to the first time that the firm appeared
in the CRSP monthly data. ROA equals the ratio of income to total assets. CapEx-
Assets Ratio equals the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Growth Rate
equals the average annual growth rate in real sales over the most recent three fiscal
years. Leverage equals the ratio of long-term debt plus debt due in one year to total
assets. Insider % equals the percentage of the firm's common stock held by
directors and officers. Large Institutional SH is an indicator for the presence of an
institutional shareholder holding at least five percent of the firm's outstanding
common stock.
Tobin's Q 1.85
(1.51)
Classified Board Incidence 0.61
(0.49)
Charter-Based Classified Board 0.54
Incidence (0.50)
GIM Index 8.60
(2.55)
Firm Age (months) 296.08
(221.53)
ROA 0.02
(0.19)
CapEx-Assets Ratio 0.06
(0.06)
Assets (millions, 2002 dollars) 10,066.99
(41,421.29)
Growth Rate 0.14
(1.98)
Leverage 0.23
(0.19)
Delaware Incorporation 0.54
(0.50)
Insider % 0.03
(0.08)
Large Institutional SH 0.76
(0.43)
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TABLE II:
HAUSMAN-TAYLOR ESTIMATES
Column 1 presents the results of Hausman-Taylor regressions of industry-adjusted
Tobin's Q on classified board status, as well as on firm financial and governance
controls, using the following set of instruments: (QVXI , QX 2 , PvX), where X, =
(firm age, firm age squared), X2 is the set of remaining control variables, QZ is the
matrix Z converted into deviations from individual means, and PZ is the matrix Z
converted into individual means. Column 2 uses charter-based classified boards in
place of the general classified board indicator. Column 3 replaces industry-adjusted
Q with regular Tobin's Q and a full set of industry dummies. Column 4 presents the
results of pooled OLS estimation. Column 5 presents the results of the Amemiya-
MaCurdy estimator. Columns 1-3 and 5 limit the sample to those firms
incorporated after 1973. Each regression controls for year-fixed effects. Robust
Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are
indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Classified -0.89** -0.96** -0.81* -0.05"* -1.05
Board (0.44) (0.42) (0.48) (0.02) (0.98)
GIM Index -0.17** -0.13 -0.15* -0.06*** -0.24
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.35)
GIM Index 0.01** 0.01 0.01* 0.00** 0.02
Squared (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Firm Age -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00"** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** -0.00
Squared (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ROA 1.70*** 1.85*** 2.07*** 2.91*** 3.08***
(0.26) (0.29) (0.28) (0.22) (0.87)
ROA 0.77*** 0.89 0.90*** 0.62*** 2.50
Squared (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (1.58)
CapEx 2.27** 2.42* 2.45** 3.76*** 6.25
Ratio (1.12) (1.25) (1.11) (0.43) (4.40)
CapEx -2.55 -3.09 -2.55 -8.47*** -22.47
Ratio Sq. 2.89 (3.38) (2.87) (1.61) (13.94)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Cont'd) (Cont'd) (Cont'd) (Cont'd) (Cont'd)
Assets -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00
(billions) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Assets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
Squared (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.41*** 0.10
Rate (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.47)
Growth -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01"** -0.19
Rate Sq. (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.19)
Leverage -1.20** -1.16** -1.38*** -3.29*** 1.62
(0.47) (0.48) (0.42) (0.22) (3.78)
Leverage 0.79 0.93 1.11** 3.80*** -5.03
Squared (0.71) (0.65) (0.54) (0.39) (8.03)
Delaware -0.31* -0.38** -0.21 0.01 -0.71
Incorp. (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.02) (0.47)
Insider % 0.50 -0.16 0.31 -0.14 -2.01
(0.98) (1.05) (0.99) (0.27) (1.69)
Insider % -1.32 -0.14 -1.28 -0.28 2.19
Squared (1.93) (1.94) (1.90) (0.62) (3.05)
Large Inst. -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.16*** -0.05
SH (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.13)
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TABLE 111:
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES
This table presents the results of difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD)
regressions. The coefficient of the interaction term CB * DE * Post-1995 captures
the isolated relationship between classified boards and Tobin's Q. DE refers to
Delaware incorporation. Post-1995 is an indicator for the post-1995 period. CB
refers to the predicted likelihood of having a classified board (formed using the
coefficients derived from annual regressions of classified board status on a set of
observable predictors). Column 4 replaces the predicted classified board likelihood
with actual classified board status. Column 3 uses charter-based classified boards
in place of the general classified board indicator. Column 5 limits the sample to
those firms that went public prior to 1995. Each regression accounts for state, year
and industry fixed effects and includes a set of financial and other controls.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In columns I and 3-5, Robust Huber-
White standard errors are reported. In column 2, standard errors are clustered by
state of incorporation. Statistical significance is indicated by *, **, and *** for
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CB * DE * -0.47*** -0.47* -0.37** -0.28*** -0.39**
Post-1995 (0.17) (0.25) (0.17) (0.08) (0.17)
CB * DE 0.42*** 0.42 0.35** 0.20*** 0.37***
(0.14) (0.25) (0.14) (0.07) (0.13)
CB * Post- 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.12* 0.01
1995 (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.06) (0.13)
DE * Post- 0.34*** 0.34 0.25** 0.23*** 0.29**
1995 (0.12) (0.21) (0.11) (0.07) (0.12)
CB -0.02 -0.02 -0.21 -0.15"** -0.08
(0.14) (0.22) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13)
DE -0.30*** -0.30 -0.23** -0.16*** -0.25**
(0.10) (0.20) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10)
Post-1995 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.14
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11)
GIM Index -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Firm Age -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00"** -0.00*** -0.00"**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Cont'd) (Cont'd) (Cont'd) (Cont'd) (Cont'd)
ROA 1.58*** 1.58*** 1.50*** 1.57*** 2.44***
(0.29) (0.50) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28)
CapEx 2.16*** 2.16*** 2.18*** 2.20*** 2.04***
Ratio (0.27) (0.38) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26)
Assets -0.00"** -0.00*** Q0*** -0.0O** -0.00***
(billions) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00 (0.00) (0.00)
Growth 0.17** 0.17** 0.16** 0.17** 0.15"*
Rate (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Leverage -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.11** -1.13*** -1.00***
(0.11) (0.21) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Insider % -0.20 -0.20 -0.16 -0.19 -0.26*
(0.14) (0.27) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Large Inst. -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.21***
SH (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
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